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Abstract 
Antoni Kępiński remains an often read and quoted author even 40 years after his premature death. 
Usually he is read in the context of his times and his connections with contemporary philosophy. 
This paper aims to show other aspects of his reflections on psychiatry. His views on the position of 
psychiatry within medicine, its methods, psychophysical problems, and other issues are compared 
with current knowledge and current thought paradigms. The goal is to show that while Kępiński 
was obviously functioning within a different scientific and philosophical paradigm many of his 
ideas and reflections can still be found within current debates. The important conclusion is to not 
hold on to the views that Kępiński held himself because he did not know as much as we do, but to 
see the importance of the debates that he foresaw even then and possibly learn something from his 
extensive clinical experience. 
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 
This paper is not the paper I set out to write. My original idea was to use my 
reading of Antoni Kępiński’s works as an additional validation of some theses in 
my own research. However, while reading Kępiński and preparing this paper 
I have decided it would be too far-fetched and at the same time it would have 
little value for English-speaking readers wanting to learn about Kępiński. So 
I would like to offer something else instead. 
Within the very small body of publications (available so far) in English on 
Kępiński one can find several kinds of works. First are technical psychiatric 
publications like Andrzej Kokoszka’s attempts to develop further some aspects 
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of Kępiński’s theory of informational metabolism1 and his psychotherapeutic 
methods. 2  Then there are more general writings on the life and role of 
a psychiatrist3 which tellingly have been published in a psychoanalytical journal. 
There is also the Paweł Łuków’s chapter on the ethical dimension of Kepiński’s 
psychiatry in the conference book from 2014, as well as a biographical paper by 
Willer, Schochow & Steger, and German translations of excerpts from 
Kepiński’s works in the same volume.4 A general outline of Kępiński’s ideas has 
been made accessible to the English speaking public by Andrzej Kapusta in his 
2007 paper.5 If we look into Polish language literature everything that has been 
written outside medical writings on Kępiński’s work is written in personalist, 
phenomenological or similar “continental” traditions, and tries to develop and 
interpret his thoughts and ideas in the spirit of what was the predominant way of 
thinking in his time and place. One can summon a multitude of such examples 
and in fact every recent reprint of Kępiński’s books offers a long list of such 
publications as an addendum. I shall mention here only one such work as an 
example – Elżbieta Stawnicka in her book Antoni Kępiński’s philosophy of 
man,6 unpacks Kępiński’s philosophical reflections by quoting extensively from 
the whole body of his works and reads those quotes through classics of 
psychoanalytical writing such as Freud and Jung, as well as theologians and 																																																								
1  Andrzej Kokoszka, “Information metabolism as a model of human experiences,” The 
International Journal of Neuroscience 97, 3–4 (1999); Andrzej Kokoszka, Andrzej Bielecki and 
Paweł Holas, “Mental organization according to the metabolism of information model and its 
mathematical description,” The International Journal of Neuroscience 107, 3–4 (2001). 
2  Agnieszka Sym, Katarzyna Wiraszka Lewandowska and Andrzej Kokoszka, “Corrective 
Experience of Values and Existential Fulfillment in a course of short-term psychodynamic group 
psychotherapy,” Existenzanalyse 23, 1 (2006). 
3 Antoni Kępiński, “Sorrows and Joys of the Psychotherapist,” Journal of the American Academy 
of Psychoanalysis 9, 3 (1981); Jacek Bomba, “Heritage of Antoni Kępiński,” Archives of 
Psychiatry and Psychotherapy 9, 1–2 (2007). 
4 Paweł Łuków, “Ethical foundation of Antoni Kępiński’s psychiatry,” in Ethik in der Psychiatrie 
und Psychotherapie, herausgegeben von Florian Steger, Jan C. Joerden und Andrzej 
M. Kaniowski, (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 2015); Manuel Willer, Maximilian Schochow und 
Florian Steger, “Antoni Kępiński (1918–1972) – Eine Skizze zu Biographie und Werk des 
polnischen Psychiaters, Psychologen und Philosophen,” in Ethik in der Psychiatrie und 
Psychotherapie, herausgegeben von Florian Steger, Jan C. Joerden und Andrzej M. Kaniowski, 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 2015); Antoni Kępiński, “Das sogenannte KZ-Syndrom. Versuch 
einer Synthese,” in Ethik in der Psychiatrie und Psychotherapie, herausgegeben von Florian 
Steger, Jan C. Joerden und Andrzej M. Kaniowski, (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 2015); Antoni 
Kępiński, “Der Begriff der Psychopathie und das Wertesystem,” in Ethik in der Psychiatrie und 
Psychotherapie, herausgegeben von Florian Steger, Jan C. Joerden und Andrzej M. Kaniowski, 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 2015). 
5 Andrzej Kapusta, “Life circle, time and the self in Antoni Kępiński’s conception of information 
metabolism,” Filosofija, Sociologija 1 (2007). 
6 Elżbieta Stawnicka, Filozofia człowieka Antoniego Kępińskiego (Zielona Góra: Wydawnictwo 
Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej im. Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego, 1999). 
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philosophers such as Levinas, Ricoeur and Tischner. While this is very interest-
ing for historians of modern continental philosophy or Polish intellectual life, 
and possibly may provide profound insights into the human condition, I would 
like to offer a radically different perspective that may well be new. I would like 
to read Kępiński as he relates to philosophy of medicine and psychiatry (more 
on the relation between the two towards the end of this paper) that investigates 
psychiatry-as-practice and psychiatry-as-science with more focus on current 
topics in philosophy of medicine such as evidence, nosology and the role of 
values in the two. I would also like to keep the connection to the medical 
practice without straying into technicalities of medicine itself. It would seem to 
me that such a reading might be much more interesting for practitioners and 
medical ethicists looking to gain from Kępiński’s insights.  
Everyone who is interested in biomedical science has noticed the rapid pace 
of progress and enormous output of scientific literature that is hard to keep up 
with. The rate of growth of the literature is such that whole meta-research is 
being called for on how to let practitioners keep up.7 Typically a paper that is  
5–7 years old is treated as outdated and even major textbooks are being rewritten 
every few years to incorporate new knowledge. This process even affected 
medical ethics in which the most influential book is into its 7th edition since 
1977 when the 1st edition was published.8 In this fast paced world of medical 
literature, books written by Antoni Kępiński, and published by his students after 
his passing away, have been read for nearly 40 years and received multiple 
editions, revisions and much attention in Poland. The question I would like to 
answer in this paper is if those are only popular readings now – as they have 
been published by literary publishers – or do they still hold academic value for 
practitioners and theorists of medicine after so much time has passed. 
 
 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
In order to look properly at the main body of Kępiński’s work we need to 
establish at what the stage of development of medical science was in the field of 
psychiatry when he was practicing, what were the standards, knowledge and 
possibilities of the time and place, as well as what has changed since then. This 																																																								
7 Eloise Clark, “From outdated to updated, keeping clinical guidelines valid,” International 
Journal for Quality in Health Care 18, 3 (2006); Brian S. Alper et al., “How much effort is needed 
to keep up with the literature relevant for primary care?,” Journal of the Medical Library 
Association: JMLA 92, 4 (2004); Sackett claims in his seminal 1996 paper that it requires 19 hours 
per week to keep up with literature just on general medicine: David L. Sackett et al., “Evidence 
based medicine: what it is and what it isn’t,” British Medical Journal 312, 7023 (1996). 
8 Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012). 
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will be needed to show what parts of his clinical experience, that he has written 
down in his books, are still relevant, which ones are possibly outdated and – 
what I find most interesting – which parts were precognizant of future 
developments in the field. In December 2014, the journal History of Psychiatry 
published a paper containing a list of the 10 biggest developments in psychiatry 
after WWII based on practitioners’ reports.9 Some of those started happening 
when Kępiński was still active, but he would not live to see the results and some 
of those developments he never saw, as the spread of the new ideas behind the 
iron curtain was significantly delayed.10 Let us briefly review only those of the 
changes mentioned in that paper that are significant here: 
Two waves of the psychopharmacological revolution 
Nothing changed psychiatric practice more than the availability of the arsenal of 
biological treatments. Among them psychopharmaceuticals are preeminent. In 
Psychopathology of neurosis,11 Kępiński reviews the medications available to 
him at the time, mentioning: neuroleptics, ataractics (e.g. diazepam) and 
thymoleptics (among those MAO inhibitors). He also mentions substances such 
as LSD as used by other psychiatrists, but he did not believe in their therapeutic 
value. However, he did not live to see the revolution of the 1970s and 1980s 
caused by the invention of SSRI’s and atypical antipsychotics as well as other 
groups of medication, and the new inventive ways of administration. So he did 
not see the profound changes it brought to psychiatric practise. He did, however, 
observe two things that are relevant here: 1. The dangers of the overreliance on 
medication where adjustment of attitudes and effort is required from the patient 
and 2. The dangers of addiction on both a personal and social level. Regardless 
of the reservations, he firmly opted for a combination of therapeutic methods 
based on efficacy,12 calling his method of choice “clinical” and a middle way 
between pure biological or psychotherapeutic approaches.  
Deinstitutionalisation 
Kępiński’s psychiatry was mostly bound to his teaching hospital in Cracow. He 
was famous for his close relationships with his patients, for whom he “found 
time in the clinic, at home, and even on the street”.13 He was looking for ways of 
introducing group therapy and the participation of patients’ friends and family, 																																																								
9 Mark S. Micale, “The ten most important changes in psychiatry since World War II,” History of 
Psychiatry 25, 4 (2014). 
10 We know exactly when Kępiński wrote his books. Most of them were prepared for publication 
in autumn of 1971 and early spring of 1972 during final months of his fatal illness while others 
that he wrote earlier were revised. See introduction to: Antoni Kępiński, Lęk (Warszawa: 
Państwowy Zakład Wydawniczy Wydawnictw Lekarskich, 1987). 
11 Antoni Kępiński, Psychopatologia nerwic (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2002), 292–293. 
12 Kępiński, Psychopatologia nerwic, 294. 
13 Kępiński, Lęk.  
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yet all of this he did in an environment of a large teaching hospital. He mentions 
the need of refuge for the patients (Polish “azyl”),14 but he still imagines it 
within a psychiatric hospital. While the first deinstitutionalization efforts started 
during Kępiński’s lifetime (just to give an example one can mention R.D. 
Laing’s (1927–1989) experiments of the 1960s) the whole movement to commu-
nity care did not happen in the most developed countries until the 1980s, and 
one can say that Polish psychiatry still waits for a large push that way. 
Decline of psychoanalysis 
As mentioned earlier, Kępiński’s writings predate the availability of a large 
portion of currently available medications as well as many newer psy-
chotherapeutic methods like cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) and other 
evidence-based psychotherapies, yet he was somewhat sceptical about the 
psychoanalysis of his times and treated it only as a first step in a direction of the 
development of a new “energetic” theory of the mind.15 He was deeply affected 
by Freudian language and theories, but he didn’t treat those terminologies and 
notions as the names of some real substantial entities, but rather as a manner of 
speech. 
Increasing role of psychiatric nosologies 
Antoni Kępiński has put much thought into the classification and labelling used 
in his profession. He wrote on this topic in his specialized books on particular 
types of disorders, as well as in the short introductory volume titled Main 
Problems in Current Psychiatry.16  What we can read there could well be 
a comment in current debates on the next iteration of the DSM. The classifica-
tions are not to be treated as basic categories of thinking for practitioners, but  
rather as assistance, ways of communicating and attempts at research of 
psychiatric disorders. What is staggering for modern readers is that even back 
then he expresses an expectation of finding a biological basis of at least some 
disorders as the neurosciences progress,17 and, as a result, to arrive at a proper 
classification as in somatic medicine. He writes that such psychiatric medicine 
would be like treating stomach ulcers. 
Proliferation of psychiatric diagnoses 
A large body of Kępiński’s work was based on experiences of extreme trauma 
such as the famous KZ-syndrome in concentration camp survivors. He was then 
well aware of how external conditions are able to influence psychopathology. 																																																								
14 Kępiński, Psychopatologia nerwic. 
15 Antoni Kępiński, Rytm życia (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2001), 266–274. 
16 Antoni Kępiński, Podstawowe zagadnienia współczesnej psychiatrii (Kraków: Wydawnictwo 
Literackie, 2003). 
17 Kępiński, Rytm życia, 265. 
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He also observed how the disconnection from values and changes in society can 
have a similar impact. His repeated calls for a reconnection to values were 
matched with his moderate optimism about the future. In his futurological essay 
An attempt of psychiatric diagnosis18 he writes that although the future would 
bring even more pressure on the human psyche that is essentially unchanged 
from ancient times and unsuited to the pressures, speed and viscosity (pol. 
“lepkość”) of modern life, we most probably will learn to moderate those 
processes on a biological level. Is that not just what we do when we treat 
disorders that are really a result of pressure to conform with social norms?19 
There is one more historical topic that needs to be addressed, but was not 
mentioned by Micale’s interviewees; the topic of currently outdated biological 
therapies in psychiatry. Kępiński mentions sub-comatic insulin, insulin coma and 
electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), as well as exercise, water therapy and 
massage.20 Kępiński’s description of ECT in Melancholy is especially disturbing 
for the current reader when he writes of such adverse events as fractured vertebrae 
and death as well as the intense fear of the patients. This is the ECT from the early 
years as depicted in One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest. He was perfectly aware 
that anaesthesia and muscle relaxants were options, but the medical view at the 
time was that it was less efficacious when administered that way.21 Kępiński did 
not live to see antipsychiatry with its condemnation of such practices. His view 
was that any therapy, however risky or safe, needs to have its risks balanced 
against the potential benefits and clinical presentation of a particular patient’s 
disorder. It will not be too much of a conjecture to say that he would embrace the 
modern incarnation of ECT while refusing other therapies their merits. 
For the sake of completeness I should mention that Kępiński expressed deep 
scepticism about psychosurgery, 22  but it is more on the grounds of poor 
outcomes and unknown mechanisms than any deep convictions. This modality 
did not get much traction in Poland anyway. 
LESSONS LEARNED AND LESSONS TO BE LEARNED 
We have reviewed extensively the major differences between the realities of 
Kępiński’s psychiatry and what is available to practitioners nowadays. So what 
has to be rejected and what can be saved as a source of inspiration for current 
discussion? 																																																								
18 Ibidem, 147–189. 
19 Medication in some orthodox religious groups with stringent moral codes would be a good 
example,  e.g. Yair Ettinger, “Rabbi's Little Helper,” Haaretz Daily Newspaper April 06, 2012. 
20 Antoni Kępiński, Poznanie chorego (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2002), 185; Kępiński, 
Psychopatologia nerwic, 294–295; Antoni Kępiński and Jacek Bomba, Melancholia (Kraków: 
Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2003). 
21 Kępiński and Bomba, Melancholia, 255. 
22 Ibidem, 259. 
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The most often mentioned theory of Kępiński, and the theoretical 
underpinning of all his writings is his – never finished – theory of informational 
metabolism. It is quite a heroic attempt at expressing mental phenomena in 
terms of biological phenomena and evolutionary explanations before the 
explosion of the neurosciences in the late 20th century. Kępiński wasn’t 
a theorist, but rather a practitioner, yet he developed a framework in which his 
therapeutic concepts would function. The idea to express the mental in terms of 
biological laws, and explain various disorders in terms of disturbances of the 
realisation of those laws and principles in a way similar to somatic disease being 
a disturbance of biological functions of the organism was brilliant at the time. 
Still it must be said that we have much more developed models in cognitive 
neuroscience nowadays, with a better evidence base and more sophisticated 
means of describing the transition from the biological to the mental with 
multiple layers of explanation.23 Nevertheless, if not for the relative academic 
isolation of Polish medicine at the time, and the language barrier, it seems that 
his theory could have been much more influential. Considering the relative 
success of Kępiński as a practitioner, this framework must have been adequate 
enough to provide a connection for various parts of his diagnostic and therapeu-
tic arsenal. 
It is worth noting at this point the philosophical significance of Kępiński’s 
informational metabolism theory. He is a methodological naturalist like any 
modern scientist and rejects dualistic concepts.24 This is not the usual type of 
phenomenological thinking, as for Kępiński all levels of perception and action 
are in the end realised in neurological mechanisms of the central nervous 
system.25 This has far reaching consequences for philosophy of psychiatry. As 
mentioned before he did not accept the then-popular divide between biological 
and psychoanalytical psychiatry. That is why the human person is one organism 
and various treatments are just different routes of administration of stimuli, 
either mental or biological.26 This is a very modern view of psychiatry that treats 
sick persons, not sick psyches. This holism is visible in Kępiński’s emphasis on 
physical examinations, on using laboratory and imaging tests where appropriate, 
on training psychiatrists in general and internal medicine as well as neurology.27 																																																								
23 For introduction to state-of-art in that field I would like to refer the reader to: Gualtiero Piccinini 
and Carl Craver, “Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism 
sketches,” Synthese 183 (2011); Worth Boone and Gualtiero Piccinini, “The cognitive 
neuroscience revolution,” Synthese, 193, 5 (2016), accessed: February 24, 2016, doi:10.1007/ 
s11229-015-0783-4. Comprehensive explanation of Kępiński's model (together with schemata) 
can be found in: Kokoszka, “Information metabolism”. 
24 Kępiński, Podstawowe zagadnienia, 8. 
25 He even goes as far as to say that animal psychology is useful for understanding human 
behaviour, Kępiński, Podstawowe zagadnienia, 7. 
26 Kępiński, Psychopatologia nerwic, 251–252. 
27 Kępiński, Poznanie chorego, 180–184. 
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A VOICE IN THE MODERN DEBATES 
As can be seen, even though he was a psychiatrist in the 1950s and 1960s – he 
did the majority of his clinical work then – Kępiński had an amount of healthy 
scepticism towards the methods of the time and would look to other tools and 
methods when available. Probably due to his extensive clinical experience he 
noticed many problems that would stay within the scope of interests of theorists 
of psychiatry and psychiatric ethics for years to come. 
The obvious issue that is visible throughout his works is the lack of methods 
of investigation of psychic phenomena and their pathologies in an objective 
way. This is where his peculiar phenomenology comes into play, and I will not 
focus on that.28 It needs to be mentioned, for the sake of accurateness, that he 
indeed doubted that methods – available in his times – were adequate for 
objective scientific (in the meaning of the word science as natural science) 
investigation of the efficacy of treatments and classification of psychopatholo-
gies. Science of understanding, instead of science of measurement, was required 
and clinical experience was more valid than results of early clinical trials. We 
must remember that not only was this years before the evidence-based medicine 
(EBM) movement, but also years before the main works of Archibald Cochrane, 
so it is not surprising that he did not possess the sophisticated experimental 
methodologies of today. Still even though he expressed such reservations in his 
theoretical books, in his own research on KZ-syndrome, Kępiński employed 
statistical methods.29 This dual humanistic and scientific approach was probably 
a reason for his scepticism towards classical psychoanalysis and resulted in 
attempts at developing his own therapeutic methods.  
Another issue, as already mentioned, that Kępiński saw very clearly, was the 
great promise of biological treatments, mostly psychopharmacology, in the 
treatment of psychiatric maladies. Not only did he appreciate the possibilities 
that medication brought into psychiatry but he also saw the great promise of 
future neuroscience and the development of new therapeutic agents. Still he 
noted the dilemma of change driven by personal effort as opposed to change 
driven by direct external influence on the brain. Pharmacology can only do so 
much if change in environment, or in the mental states of the patient is required. 
One can only wonder what would be his comment on the newest developments 
such as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMC) and other direct manipulations 
on the brain, just as in Kępiński’s work we still argue about the importance of 
authenticity in the treatment of mental and brain disorders. Even though I am 
here with Neil Levy30 and I don’t think that authenticity can be used anymore as 																																																								
28 For best presentation in the English language see: Kapusta, “Life circle, time and the self”. 
29 Jolanta Walczewska et al., “Stiffness of large arteries and cardiovascular risk in patients with 
post-traumatic stress disorder,” European Heart Journal 32, 6 (2011). 
30 Neil Levy, Neuroethics. Challenges for the 21st Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007). 
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serious argument, I have to acknowledge that these issues are far from settled in 
the literature, and one has to appreciate that Kępiński already saw the issue back 
then. 
Current psychiatry talks much about open dialogue, about creating 
possibilities of safe semi-normal functioning even for very ill patients. This is 
something that Kępiński was very much a predecessor of. He realised the 
importance of real therapeutic relationships and cooperation as well as healthy 
environment. He did this before the devastating criticisms of anti-psychiatrists, 
before the patient empowerment movement and – what bioethicists will find 
most curious – before the bioethics revolution. This might not be obvious for 
someone not acquainted with the residual paternalism in current medical 
practice in Poland, but when Kępiński writes that “in no case one should lie to 
the patient”31 in a book posthumously published in 1978, but written in the early 
1970s he is almost a revolutionary. He emphasised the same things that are still 
emphasised when educating the public: stigmatisation of the mentally ill, lack of 
evidence for particular dangers of this population, and the benefits of 
functioning within society for the patients, things Polish psychiatric care still 
largely struggles to achieve. 
The second decade of the 21st century has seen constant debates over the new 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM 5th 
ed.) by the American Psychiatric Association, and everyone – including the 
general public – has heard about the problems in classifying disorders, and 
medicalising certain behaviours and ways of living.32 Kępiński was functioning 
in a completely different world, which in many ways would be alien to us now. 
It would be only in 1973 – after his death – when homosexuality would no 
longer be considered a psychiatric disorder. Still he wrote on the very same 
problems as debated now and with a very clear voice. According to Kępiński, 
the extant nosology of his time is nothing substantial and largely a matter of 
custom. He writes that the nosology he describes is “neither very useful in 
etiological research, nor in therapeutic endeavours.”33 Psychiatric treatment – 
says Kępiński – is mostly based on the symptomatology present and not really 
predicated on existing formal diagnosis. However, as mentioned earlier, he 
expressed hopes for future science to classify the various disorders by – 
eventually identified – aetiologies. This is the hope that NIMH director Thomas 
Insel expressed in exactly the same form in a 2013 blogpost.  
A lot is being said about the holistic nature of modern medicine. We now 
understand much better the incredible interdependence of various systems in the 
body and processes of the mind. This resulted in such ideas as the modular 																																																								
31 Kępiński, Poznanie chorego, 136.  
32  Just one example of a voice in these debates: Julia Bandini, “The Medicalization of 
Bereavement: (Ab)normal Grief in the DSM-5,” Death Studies 39, 6 (2015). 
33 Kępiński, Podstawowe zagadnienia, 65.  
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system of teaching in medical schools where basic sciences and pre-clinical 
subjects are bundled with clinical internships in relevant areas – all connected 
seamlessly. This is supposed, among other things, to bring back the age old rule 
of treating patients, not organs or systems. The same innovative practice was 
proposed by Kępiński in a chapter first published in 1962.34  
Current debates in philosophy of medicine are often centred on translation of 
medical science into medical practice and introduction of patient’s values into 
the equation.35 The textbook formulation is that today’s medicine should be “the 
integration of best research evidence with clinical expertise and patient 
values.”36 In Kępiński’s works the evidence would be what he calls “scientific 
knowledge,” the clinical judgement would be “humanistic knowledge” and 
moral values would be integrated into his thinking on psychiatry on all levels.37 
When we read a recent paper on values-based practice (VBP) one can easily see 
how Kępiński could repeat the arguments of the author.38 We cannot know how 
Kępiński would view what Mark Micale called big science in psychiatry,39 but 
I am of the opinion that he would appreciate the possibilities and expanded 
scope of evidence while holding on to valuable human contact exactly as he 
presents his ideal of psychiatric treatment in his books. 
 
 
PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHIATRY AS PHILOSOPHY OF MEDICINE 
 
I have promised the reader to discuss the relationship between psychiatry and 
medicine in general in Kępiński’s works, the relation of his philosophy of 
medicine to philosophy of psychiatry. That is another area that I think is mostly 
underappreciated by his commentators and by philosophers of psychiatry writing 
about Kępiński. All the relevant facts have been already presented. Kępiński of 
course recognises the distinct nature of the two practices,40 but at the same time he 
recognises the continuity and unity of the medical disciplines. Even if neurology 
is distinct from psychiatry with only small overlap, psychiatry still requires 
training in all medical disciplines and expert knowledge of various ailments of the 																																																								
34 Kępiński, Rytm życia, 287. 
35 On values in psychiatric practice: K. W. M. (Bill) Fulford, “Values-Based Practice: A New 
Partner to Evidence-Based Practice and A First for Psychiatry?,” Mens Sana Monographs 6, 
1 (2008): 10. 
36  Sharon E. Straus et al., Evidence-Based Medicine: How to Practice and Teach EBM, 
(Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone, 2005). 
37 See: Łuków, “Ethical foundation”. 
38 Sarah Wieten, “‘What the patient wants’: an investigation of the methods of ascertaining patient 
values in evidence-based medicine and values-based practice,” Journal of Evaluation in Clinical 
Practice, October 30, 2015, accessed: February 24, 2016, doi:10.1111/jep.12471. 
39 Micale, “The ten most important changes”. 
40 Kępiński, Podstawowe zagadnienia, 7–8. 
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body as well as disorders of the mind.41 He also recognises that every medical 
doctor is a psychiatrist from time to time, when needed, as somatic diseases have 
psychiatric components as well.42 Physicians of other specialities as well as nurses 
might even teach psychiatrists something by their improvised psychotherapy. The 
continuity is also expressed in a continuity of values. Regardless of speciality, 
healers are supposed to alleviate suffering and they should use all the tools that are 
adequate to the task at hand and available to them. Kępiński is aware that all kinds 
of medicine have their limitations, and as a result, physicians can sometimes only 
offer their presence and attention as medicine. This is identical regardless of the 
nature of the malady the person suffers from, be it psychic or somatic. Kępiński 
treated the medical profession as an art and a calling. The psychiatric speciality 
would be for him an area accessible only for those who proved themselves as 
physicians and had appropriate mental predilections and maturity. He even went 
so far as to postulate that the speciality should only be open to doctors over 30 to 
ensure the latter virtue. 43  Kępiński’s view of psychiatry as an integral and 
indispensable part of medicine is particularly appealing today, as the first 
biological markers for psychiatric disorders are being discovered such as genetic 
markers44 or particular patterns in Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI),45 while 
ever more sophisticated direct interventions to the brain and biochemistry of the 
central nervous system are being developed. The gap that existed between 
psychiatry and much of the rest of medicine for about 100 years is being rapidly 
filled and this is very much in line with Kępiński’s idea of a medical doctor 
specialising in mental disorders.  
 
 
SOURCE OF INTELLECTUAL INSPIRATION EVEN NOW 
 
The reading provided here is atypical and one-sided in many respects. One 
cannot claim of course that Kępiński would find his way in current 
aforementioned debates. He was a person from a different time and different 
realities. His writings are products of psychoanalytical theory of early 
20th century as much as meta-scientific insights presented here. Many of his 
treatment and diagnostic ideas are simply outdated;46 some of his views are 																																																								
41 Kępiński, Poznanie chorego, 179–183. 
42 Kępiński, Lęk, 312–313. 
43 Kępiński, Poznanie chorego, 180. 
44 Schizophrenia Working Group of the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium, “Biological insights 
from 108 schizophrenia-associated genetic loci,” Nature 511, 7510 (2014). 
45 Oliver Doehrmann et al., “Predicting Treatment Response in Social Anxiety Disorder From 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging,” JAMA Psychiatry 70, 1 (2013): 87. 
46 Most of the major anachronisms are pointed out in introductions and commentaries to his books 
by Professor Jacek Bomba and Professor Jerzy Aleksandrowicz.  
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dependent on his personal experiences, e.g. wartime and concentration camp 
experiences. There are many aspects of his work and ethical lessons to be 
learned that are described elsewhere. What this paper wishes to show is that 
there is no gap between Kępiński and the debates and problems we see in 
medicine and psychiatry today. Even when we discuss technical or current 
issues one can consult Kępiński’s work, filtered through a knowledge of history 
to draw on his extensive clinical experience and humanist education. In my own 
research on decision-making in psychiatric ethics I find very inspiring 
Kępiński’s calls for seeing the human in person on the one hand, but using 
multifactorial approaches to learn about the person. The important task of 
medical humanities is combining such work of past clinicians with the best 
current knowledge and looking for future directions and answers. Through such 
continued reapplication and reinterpretation, his work will remain current for 
years to come. One can only wonder how Polish and international psychiatric 
practice would look if such middle-ground approaches, combining humanistic 
and scientific knowledge were disseminated during Kępiński’s lifetime. 
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